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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4664 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN BERNARD BLACKSTONE, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
A.L. THOMPSON, Sued in his individual and official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00899) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 5, 2014 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stephen Bernard Blackstone, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the 
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged that Corrections Officer Alfred 
L. Thompson violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from an attack by 
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his cellmate.  After discovery, Thompson filed a motion for summary judgment, which 
the District Court granted on the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.  Blackstone 
appealed.
1
  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm.  
I. 
 Blackstone’s complaint alleged that Corrections Officer A.L. Thompson failed to 
protect him from his cellmate, Gary Weedon.  According to the allegations, on November 
9, 2010, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Blackstone told Thompson that he was having 
problems with Weedon, that he did not feel comfortable around Weedon, and that he 
wanted to move.  In response, Thompson informed Blackstone that he did not have the 
authority to move inmates.  He provided Blackstone with a DC-135A Request to Staff 
form and instructed him to fill out the form and give it to the unit manager the following 
day.  Blackstone filled out the form and immediately placed it in the unit manager’s 
mailbox.  He wrote, among other things: “I believe my cellie may try to assault me in the 
cell tonight.”  [Doc. 1, Complaint, Exh. A].  It is undisputed that Thompson never saw 
the written request.   
 That evening, Blackstone sustained injuries from a fight with his cellmate.  
According to Blackstone, he was lounging in the dayroom when Weedon attacked him, 
                                              
1
   Blackstone subsequently filed a post-judgment motion seeking relief from the final 
judgment in order to introduce new evidence.  The District Court denied that motion.  
That denial is not before us, as Blackstone did not file a timely new or amended Notice of 
Appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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unprovoked.  The attack resulted in facial contusions, blurred vision, lingering headaches 
and a fractured orbital bone.  Thompson conceded that there was a fight but maintained 
that the altercation was mutual, as opposed to an unprovoked assault.  Thompson 
described the fight accordingly in an incident report.  Prison officials conducted a 
disciplinary hearing.  After the hearing officer reviewed video evidence, Blackstone and 
Weedon were both found guilty of fighting.  As punishment, Blackstone was assigned to 
restricted housing for thirty days.    
 Blackstone alleged that prison policy DC-ADM 802 authorizes an inmate to 
request self-lockup for his own protection, but that he was not given that option by 
Thompson.  He further claimed that Thompson knew or should have known that Weedon 
was likely to assault Blackstone because, in addition to Blackstone’s express statement to 
Thompson, Weedon carried an inmate status of “H-Code,” signifying that he was a high 
risk inmate.  Blackstone also alleged that Thompson knew that other inmates had 
complained about Weedon in the past.   
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily 
affirm if Blackstone’s appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 
and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  When reviewing orders granting summary judgment we apply 
the same test as the District Court, granting summary judgment where there remains no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).  We view 
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the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.  See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
 To survive Thompson’s motion for summary judgment, Blackstone needed to 
point to evidence in the record that Thompson both knew of and was deliberately 
indifferent to an excessive risk to his safety.  See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
131 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  We agree with 
the District Court that Blackstone did not adduce evidence to show that Thompson 
operated from the requisite mindset.   
 When making a determination as to deliberate indifference, the court must “focus 
[on] what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should 
have been (or should be).”  Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir.1997) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more 
blameworthy than negligence.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.  Even if Thompson “knew the 
underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise 
was insubstantial or nonexistent,” liability will not attach.  Id. at 844.  Here, there is no 
indication in the record that Thompson made the inference that an excessive risk was 
present.  Prior to the fight, Blackstone had just one communication with Thompson, in 
which Blackstone stated that he was not “getting along” and did not “feel comfortable” 
with his cellmate.  [See Doc. 66, p. 1-2].  Absent any other evidence of Thompson’s 
culpable state of mind, that singular, generalized statement is not sufficient to permit a 
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reasonable finder of fact to infer that Thompson both knew of and intentionally 
disregarded an excessive risk to Blackstone’s safety.   
 Blackstone points to Weedon’s “H-class” status as circumstantial evidence of 
Thompson’s deliberate indifference.  The risk that an inmate with some history of 
violence might attack another inmate for an unknown reason, however, is too speculative 
to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.  See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  It is true that the requisite mindset may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
such as where a plaintiff demonstrates that a substantial risk was “longstanding, 
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.”  Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 842 (citations omitted); see also Leavy, 117 F.3d at 747.  Here, however, 
there were no longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or previously noted tensions 
between Weedon and Blackstone.  Nor is there any indication in the record that 
Blackstone told Thompson of any specific incident or cause of tension between the 
cellmates from which a greater inference of risk could be drawn.  See Bistrian, 696 F.3d 
at 368-71 (permitting Eighth Amendment claims to proceed where an inmate repeatedly 
advised officials of threats he received as a result of helping an investigation that targeted 
those with whom he was placed).  To the contrary, Blackstone’s filings repeatedly 
describe the type of “out-of-the-blue and unadorned ‘I’m-in-trouble’ entreaty,” id. at 
69-70, that is commonly faced by officials, who are charged with the “arduous” task of 
managing an inmate population while protecting those in custody.  Young v. Quinlan, 
960 F. 2d 351, 363 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform 
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Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as recognized in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 
F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 We acknowledge that the factual assertions of the parties differ as to who 
instigated the altercation between Weedon and Blackstone.  That dispute, however, is not 
material to Blackstone’s claims.  See F.R.Civ.P. 56(a).  Even assuming that Blackstone 
was attacked by Weedon, Blackstone has not pointed to evidence of deliberate 
indifference.  As we have explained, the combination of Weedon’s “H-Code” status and 
one report of unspecified tensions between the cellmates does not support an inference of 
deliberate indifference.  The District Court thus correctly concluded that summary 
judgment was warranted.
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
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  We also perceive no error in the District Court’s order denying Blackstone’s request for 
counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158  (3d Cir. 1993).  We observe that 
Blackstone diligently prosecuted his case; his thorough filings reflect that he was able to 
effectively conduct discovery and present his arguments.  Id.; Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 
F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).  The District Court also did not err in denying Blackstone’s 
motion for a temporary restraining order.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. 
